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erage sales in the state. This state alone does not provide beverage
interests with an adequate population base to economically make
the necessary alterations to their systems of packaging and distribution. If non-draft beverages were not sold in the state, many
North Dakotans, particularly the approximately 50 per cent who
live within 135 miles of major shopping centers in western Minnesota,45 would simply make their beverage purchases out-of-state. The
result would be citizen inconvenience, loss of tax revenue, and a
failure to keep non-returnable containers out of North Dakota.
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This was a diversity action brought as a class action, under Rule
23 (b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1 by four lakeside property owners, representing all lakefront landowners and
lessees in the towns of Orwell, Shoreham, and Bridport, Vermont.
Plaintiffs claimed impairment of property rights resulting from altops, (b) there was no requirement that the container be reusable-only riecyclable, and (c)
a uniform refund value was assigned without regard to any scheme of container standardization.

The bill probably would have been effective In helping to solve the problems of
littering and solid waste disposal. The high refund value would be an incentive to bounty
hunters who would help keep the ditches and parks clean. However, in not banning disposable containers, recycling with Its attendant waste of energy would still be required.
Since pull-top cans were not prohibited, injuries to humans and animals resulting from
their use would not have been abated. Finally, the distributors would have received a
windfall profit as a result of deposits that were not redeemed. H. 1477, 43d Legislative
Assembly of North Dakota (1973).
45.

U.S. BUREAU OF CENsUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979 10, table

8 (94th ed.).
1. FED. R. Cv. P. 28(b).
Rule 23(b) reads:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable.
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) Inconsistent of varying adjudications with respect to Individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class or,
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final Injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to
the findings include:
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leged pollution caused by defendant's pulp and paper mill. The trial
court held that the action could not be maintained as a class action because there was no proper class over which the court
had jurisdiction. The court found "to a legal certainty" that all of
the unnamed members of the class did not meet the requisite jurisdictional amount. Despite the fact that each of the named representatives did meet the jurisdictional amount, the court did not have
jurisdiction over the unnamed members of the class and, therefore,
the suit could not be maintained as a class actibn. 2 On interlocutory
appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1229(b),s the Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling., The dissent would have allowed the suit to be maintained as a class action, using the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
to provide the jurisdiction over the unnamed members of the
class. 5 The Supreme Court also affirmed, with the dissent arguing
that ancillary jurisdiction should allow the suit to be maintained as a
class action. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
The class action was an equitable device until 1938 when the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. 6
[It] was an invention of equity . . . mothered by the
practical necessity of providing a precedural device so that
mere numbers would not disable large groups of individuals
united in interest, from enforcing their equitable rights, nor
grant them immunity from their equitable wrongs.. . .7
Rule 23 extended class actions to include legal as well as equitable actions. The original Rule 23 (a) allowed class actions if: (A)
The class is too large to practically bring each member before the
court; and (B) The named representatives will adequately represent
the interests of all members of the class; and (C) The right being
(A) the Interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
2. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
3. Interlocutory Appeal Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1958).
Section 1292(b) states:
(b) When a district judge, in making In a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
Involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state
in writing In such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, In its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application Is made to
it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court,
unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so
order.
4. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
5. Id. at 1036 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
6. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
7. Z. CHAFFIM, SOME PIoBzms OF EQUrTY 244 (1950).
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enforced is either (1) joint or common, or (2) several, but the action may affect specific property, or (3) several, but common questions of fact or law predominate and common relief is sought. These
different categories of class actions were respectively called (1)
true" (2) hybrids and (3) spurious. 10 Aggregation of claims to
meet the jurisdictional amount was allowed in true class actions,
since the right involved was common, but aggregation was not
allowed in hybrid or spurious class actions, because the right involved was several. 1 In true class actions, all members of the class
were bound by the judgment. In hybrid class actions, members of
the class were only bound by the judgment as far as it affected the
property involved. Spurious class actions did not have any binding
effect on those not named as parties.1 2 Therefore, spurious class
actions were really nothing more than an example of permissive
joinder, and as such, duplicated Rule 20 (a).' s This interpretation,
resulting in non-binding spurious class actions, combined with the
difficulty of determing whether a right in "joint or common" or
"several" caused the rule to be amended in 1966.15 The present
functional classifications were substituted for the older, more con8. Some examples of true class actions are: Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939) (members of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers sought to enjoin enforcement of a Florida statute prohibiting owners of copyrighted musical compositions from
combining to fix licensing fees) ; Boesenberg v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 128 F.2d 245
(7th Cir. 1942) (suit was brought by a beneficiary of a trust, seeking to restore to the
trust funds which were wrongfully diverted); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579
(N.D. Ga. 1960) (suit for racial discrimination in the use of recreational facilities). See also
31 J. MooE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 28.08 (1974), and 2 W. BARRON & A. HovTzorp FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 562.1 (1961).
9. Hybrid class actions were rare. Some examples are: Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d
973 (2d Cir. 1952) (two stockholders subscribed to a fund for the benefit of a corporation
and asserted a claim for secret profits made in breach of a fiduciary relationship) ; Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979, 988
(3d Cir. 1941) (a suit was brought for fraudulent inducement to buy corporate stock, if
the company had gone into receivership, the suit would have been hybrid). See also 31 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,
23.09 (1974) ; 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTzOFF, FEDERAI, PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, § 562.2 (1961).
10. Spurious class actions were those which were formed solely by the presence of a
common question of law or fact. See 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 23.10 (1974) ; 2 W.
BARRON

& A.

HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 563.3

(1961).

11. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1968).
12. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTs 311 (2d ed. 1970).
13. FED. R. Crv. P. 20(a).
Rule 20(a) reads:
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs
if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all
these persons will arise in the action. All persons (and any vessel, cargo, or
other property subject to admiralty process in rem) may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in
the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A
plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against
all the relief demanded. Judgement may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more
defendants according to their respective liabilities.
14. C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 311.
15. See Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 98.
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fusing conceptual classifications,16 and judgments were broadened
to be binding upon all members of the class who do not ask to be excluded from the class." These amendments were designed to make
the class action a viable and workable method of determining and
enforcing rights of groups of litigants.18
In Snyder v. Harris0 the Supreme Court revived the Classification of class actions based upon the type of right involved. The
Court held that claims of class members can be aggregated to
meet the requisite jurisdictional amount if the right being adjudicated is joint or common, but aggregation is not permitted if the
rights involved are separate and distinct. The Court applied this
general rule of aggregation 2 0 to class actions after reasoning that
it was based on an interpretation of the phrase "matter in controversy" in the jurisdictional statute.2 1 Further according to Rule 82,
"these rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts, or the venue of actions

there in", so the aggregation rule was not to be altered by the 1966
amendments to Rule 23.22
There have been attempts to distinguish Snyder, and its application, to allow aggregation by designating the rights involved as
16. The old Rule 23 relied on the Jural relationship between the members of the class
to determine which classification the action belonged to: true, hybrid, or spurious. The new
Rule 23 looks to the effect of the action upon the court and the parties in deciding whether
the action is maintainable as a class action. See 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIvIL, § 1753 (1972).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2), (3).
Rules 23(c) (2) and (3) read:
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A)
the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified
date; (Bl) the Judgement, whether favorable or not, will include all members
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgement in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The
Judgement in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3),
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe
those to whom the notice provided in subsection (c) (2) was directed, and who
have not requested exclusion, and who the court finds to be members of the
class.
18. See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HIARv. L. REv. 356, 875 (1967) ; Note, Class ActionsFederal Rule 23 Amended, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 127 (1967).
19. 394 U.S. 332 (1968).
20. See generally Annot., 3 A.L.R. Fed. 372, 380-83 (1970).
21. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1968).
22. Id.
The Court says:
The doctrine that separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated was
never, and is not now, based upon the categories of old Rule 23 or of any
rules of procedure. That doctrine is based rather upon this Court's interpretation of the statutory phrase "matter of controversy". The interpretation of
this phrase as precluding aggregation substantially predates the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . Nothing in the amended Rule 23 changes this
doctrine.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

joint or common and not separate and distinct. These distincitions

are being developed in cases in which a "common fund" is to be
divided among the class members. 23
The Court in Zahn followed the reasoning used in Synder, and
treated Zahn as though it were another aggregation case, saying:
[T]he Court of Appeals in the case before us accurately
read and applied Snyder v. Harris: Each plaintiff in a Rule
23 (b) (3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount,

and any
plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the
24

case.

Mr. Justice Fortas, dissenting in Snyder, liad indicated that this resuit would follow from that decision. 25 The Zahn Court relied upon

Troy v. G. A. Whitehead,2s which first voiced the general rule of
aggregation with respect to joinder, and on Clark v. Paul Gray,
Inc., 27 which extended this rule to class actions under the old Rule

23.28 After Snyder, it is clear that class actions under the new Rule
23 come within the general aggregation rule, and that aggregation
is not appropriate here. The Court recognized the basic difference
between Zahn, and Clark and Snyder. In Zahn, all of the named
representatives met the jurisdictional amount, but in both Clark
and Snyder they did not. In Clark only one member of the class met
the required amount, and in Snyder no member met the requirement.
But, the Court dismissed this difference as insignificant, and said
that if the jurisdictional amount would only apply to named plaintiffs, this would give an advantage to the unnamed members by
allowing their claims to be heard in federal court without having
to pass muster under the jurisdictional requirement.29
The Court made only passing comment on ancillary jurisdic23. Id. S6e Cass Clay Inc. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 2586 (D.S.D.
1974). Suit was brought seeking refund of overcharges by Northwestern Public Service
Co. Northwestern had a contract with the Government by which it was supposed to refund
to its customers any savings that it realized from purchasing electricity from the Government. Cass Clay alleged on behalf of all the customers that an overcharge resulted when
the savings were not passed on to the customers. The Court ruled that the right involved
was joint and common, since the rights of one member of the class could not be determined
without affecting the rest of the class, as opposed to Snyder, in which each stockholder was
statutorily authorized to bring suit.
24. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 801 (1974).
25. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 343 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting). The rule in
Snyder would apply "in all cases where one or more of the co-plaintiffs have a claim of
less than the jurisdictional amount..."
26. Id. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294 (1974), citing Troy v. G. A.
Whitehead, 222 U.S. 39, 40-1 (1911). The Court said:
When two or more plaintiffs having separate and distinct demands, unite for
convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of
each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount; but when several plaintiffs
unite to enforce a single title of right, in which they have a common and undivided Interest, it Is enough If their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional
amount.
27. Id. 306 U.S. 583 (1938).
28. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1974).
29. Id. at 300 n.9.
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tion,80 citing the Court of Appeals statement that "one plaintiff may

not ride in on another's coattails." 81 However, Justice Brennan, dissenting, viewed this doctrine as providing jurisdiction over the class
82
and allowing the suit to be maintained as a class action.
Ancillary jurisdiction is a concept by which "a district court
acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy as an entirety and
may, as an incident to dispostion of a matter properly before it,
possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of
which it could not take cognizance were they independently presented."9 8 No- independent basis for jurisdiction is necessary for
claims which are ancillary to claims within the jurisdiction of the
court.3 4 Ancillary jurisdiction was first used in Freeman v. Howe.8"

It originally encompassed only claims which have a "direct relation to property or assets actually or constructively drawn into the
court's possession or control by the principal suit."'86

In Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange 7 ancillary jurisdiction
was expanded to be used as a matter of convenience. Since that
case, the twin doctrines of ancillary and pendant jurisdiction have
gone through a great development.88 Ancillary jurisdiction has been
found to apply in: compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a),8
even if additional parties are brought in with the counterclaim under Rule 13 (h) ; 40 cross claims under Rule 13(h) ;4 1 impleader of a
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 301.
469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 1972).
414 U.S. at 306.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 19.
20 A. J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,
8.07[5] (1974).
35. 65 U.S. (24 -ow.) 450 (1860). Freeman, a U.S. marshall, seized railroad cars under
writ of attachment. The mortgagees of the railroad brought action in state court against
Freeman for replevin, and obtained judgement there. The Supreme Court held that the
state court did not have Jurisdiction over property that is under control of a federal court
The mortgagee argued that they would be left without a forum to adjudicate their claim.
But, the Supreme Court held that the federal court would have ancillary jurisdiction over
this claim and it could be brought there regardless of lack of an independent basis for
jurisdiction.
36. Fulton Nat. Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925).
87. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). Plaintiff brought suit in federal court claiming a violation of
the Sherman Act, and seeking an injunction. Defendant asserted a compulsory counterclaim
that did not involve a federal question. Plaintiff's claim was dismissed, but the court retained Jurisdiction over the counterclaim, despite lack of diversity, by using ancillary
jurisdiction.
38. Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendant Jurisdiction, 33
U. PITr. L. REV. 759, 762 n.24 (1972). Pendant jurisdiction is described in this manner.
.[T~he concept of pendant jurisdiction is generally confined to the joinder of a state law
claim to a federal claim by the same plaintiff against the same defendant in a federal
question jurisdiction case, but essentially it is closely related to ancillary jurisdiction and
may be regarded as a subspecies of it." Id.
39. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 693 (1926). See also 1A W. BARRON
& A. HOLTZOP7, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 392 n.25 (1960).

40.

Union Paving Co. v. Downer Corp., 276 F.2d 468

BARRON & A.

(9th Cir. 1960). See also 1A W.

HOLTZOPP, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 392 n.41 (1960) ; Note, Joinder

of Co-Citizen to Compulsory Counterclaim Permitted by Federal Ancillary Jurisdiction, 56
COL. L. REv. 130 (1956).
41. R. M. Smythe & Co. v. Chase National Bank, 291 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1961). See 1A
W. BARuRON & A. HOLTZoF?, FEDERAL PRACTICE Arm PROCEDURE, § 392 (1960).
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third party defendant under Rule 14;4 2 interplleader under Rule 22; 4
and intervention as of right under Rule 24(a).4 Ancillary jurisdiction does not extend to permissive counterclaims under Rule
13 (b); 4 5 joinder of claims under Rule 18,46 except where federal
and non federal claims are so closely related as to amount to seperate grounds in support of a single cause of action;4 7 joinder of parties under Rule 20; 8 or permissive intervention under Rule 24 (b) .4
It has been suggested that, "If there is any single rationalizing principle that will explain these diverse rules, it is not easily disecrned." 50 Justice Brennan suggested that factors to consider in
determining whether or not ancillary jurisdiction will be appropriate include,
impact of adjudication on the parties and third persons, the
susceptibility of the dispute or disputes in the case to resolution in a single adjudication, and the structure of the liti5 1
gation as governed by the Federall Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under these considerations ,class actions would certainly seem to be
an appropriate area in which to exercise ancillary jurisdiction."
The requirement of Rule 23 (b) (3) that "questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class must predominate" provides
the protection from using ancillary jurisdiction in class actions solely as a means of getting around the federal jurisdictional limitations.58
The dissent argues that the decision of the Court in this case
will actually result in an increased workload for the judiciary as a
whole. The four named representatives meet the jurisdictional
amount individually, and have a right to be heard in federal court.
However, the unnamed members of the class must litigate their
claims in state court, duplicating the efforts of the federal court in
many complicated areas of expert testimony and determinations
42.

Smith v. Whitmore, 270 F.2d 741 (3d Cir. 1959). See, 1A W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFF,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 424 n.21 & 22 (1960).

43. Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955).
44. East v. Crowdus, 302 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1962).
45. Autographic Register Co. v. Philip Hano Co., 198 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1952). See 1A
W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFp, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE, § 992 n.31 (1960).
46. Delman v. Federal Products Corp., 251 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1958).
47. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933).
48. Dlepen v. Fernow, 1 F.R.D. 378 (W.D. Mich. 1940).
49. Hunt Tool Co. v. Moore, Inc., 212 F.2d.685 (Sth Cir. 1954).
50. C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 21.
51. 414 U.S. 291, 305.
52. Using this ancillary jurisdiction approach had been rejected in a number of decisions,
but this was usually dictum, due to the failure of any of the parties to meet the jurisdictional amount. Hartman v. Secretary of Dep't. of H.U.D., 294 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1968).
The Fifth Circuit has applied ancillary Jurisdiction In a case such a Zahn. Lesch v. Chicago
Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 279 F. Supp. 908 (D. Ill. 1968). And this approach has been
hailed as "sound, and is a natural corollary to other applications of the ancillary jurisdic.
tion concept." 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVL, at 564
(1972).
58. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 307 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of fact. Exercising anillary jurisdiction would increase the burden
on the federal court by requiring it to perform the special functions
necessary in a class action and to determine the damages of the
unnamed members of the class, but this increased burden is much
less than the burden of a duplicate lawsuit which the state and
federal judiciary as a whole must now bear. 54 A study prepared
by Georgetown University Law School Journal indicates that class
actions do not impose undue administrative burdens on the courts. 55
The majority will also deprive many small claimants of a forum,
because many states do not provide for a device similar to Rule
23 (b) (3). Therefore, this decision runs contrary to the two major
reasons for allowing class actions, the economy of judicial resources,
and to provide a forum for a large number of small claims, which
individually would not be worth the bother to litigate, but collective56
ly, become substantial.
This decision is also inconsistent with the rule regarding determination of diversity of citizenship. Only the representatives will
be considered when determining whether complete diversity exists. 57
Considering the fact that diversity has a constitutional base, while
the limitation of amount in controversy is only statutory, "it is difficult to understand why the practical approach the Court took in
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur must be abandoned where the purely
statutory 'matter in controversy' requirement is concerned." 55,
The net result of this decision is to retard the development of
the ancillary jurisdiction concept and to all but destroy class actions
under Rule 23 (b) (3), "in diversity cases save for the extraordinary
situation in which every. member of the class has a claim in excess
of $10,000."59 This decision will severely damage any attempt to
make the class action a viable and workable tool in the federal
courts. In states which have no provision for class actions similar
to Rule 23 (b) (3) the only remedy available will be piecemeal litigation. In states such as North Dakota, which have adopted a rule
similar to Federal Rule 23 (b) (3),1o state courts must be ready to
bear the burden of litigating class actions of this type, which previously went to federal court. This seems particularly important in
54.

Id. at 308.

55.

STAFF

OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE,

93d CONG.,

2d SESS.,

CLASS

ACTioN

STUDY

(Comm. Print 1950).
56. Ford, Federal Rule 23: A
COm. L. REv. 501, 504 (1969).

57.

Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND.

&

Supreme Tribe of Ben-F-ur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
Suit was brought against a fraternal organization and its officers, headquartered in
Indiana, by a member, resident of Kentucky, on behalf of all members. This suit was held
to be binding on members who were residents of Indiana, stating that "the intervention of
the Indiana citizens in the suit would not have defeated the jurisdiction already acquired."
Id. at 866.
58. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 309 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59. C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 316.
60. N.D.R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) is identical to the federal rule.
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North Dakota in view of the impending coal development, and its
accompanying electrical generating plants, gasification plants with

all of the possibilities of damage to the environment similar to the
pollution of Lake Champlain in Zahn.
At this point, the primary method of repairing the damage done
to class actions with the Snyder and Zahn decisions is by Congres-

sional action to amend the amount in controversy clause to allow
aggregation to meet the requirement or to allow ancillary jurisdiction over the unnamed class members or to amend the jurisdictional
statute to give private citizens standing to sue for environmental
degradation.l It may also be possible to bring two suits, one for
injunctive relief under existing federal law, and another for damages,
arguing that the suit for damages is ancillary to the suit for injunctive ielief.6 2 But, it is clear that some mechanism should be found
to bring environmental class actions within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, to allow people who have been injured by environ-

mental degradation to receive compensation.
JON BEUSEN

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-ATTORNEYS'
FEES-FEES AWARDED UNDER
EQUITY TO ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST LITIGANTS FOR PROMOTING

SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTERESTS.

Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. and Friends of the Earth
instituted an action against R. C. Morton, Secretary of the Interior,
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
to bar construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline. The controversy
focused on whether the Secretary of the Interior had authority to
grant special land use permits for pipeline rights-of-way in excess
of statutory width specifications 1 and whether he had prepared
61. Bills such as this have been introduced. In the second session of the 92d Congress
(1972), S. 1032 and 11. 1049 both provided citizens with standing to bring suit for injunctive or declaratory relief for environmental degradation regardless of the amount in controversy.
62. This approach was successful in Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 309 F. Supp.
S54 (N.D. Ohio 1969). The action was brought in state court and removed. Jurisdiction
over the suit for injunctive relief was obtained by the Court, saying: "It appears to the
Court that the right of each member of the class to live in an environment free from
excessive coal dust and conversely, the right of the defendant to operate its coal loading
facility are both in excess of $10,000.00." Id. at 855. The court then assumed, jurisdiction
over the suit for damages as ancillary to the suit for injunctive relief.
For a discussion of the basis for jurisdiction over suits for injunctive relief, see,
Note, The Federal Class Action in Environmental Litigation: Problems and Possibilities,
51 N.C.L. REv. 1385, 1401 (1973).
1. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 § 28, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), provides that "Rightsof-way through public lands . . . may be granted . . . to the extent of the ground occupied by the said pipe line and twenty-five feet on each side of the same..."

